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I have something to read for you this evening and, in the course of doing 
so, hope to present you with some images. The ideas are divided into 
varyingly autonomous passages. I’ll explain why in a moment.  
 
• It’s always the hope when preparing a talk, that novel perspectives can 
be found on what are, usually, well-rehearsed themes (the opportunity to 
make a presentation doesn’t lend itself well to an exploration of entirely 
new terrain). Some of my thoughts recently have been around the question 
of how to think beyond a world circumscribed by human concerns. I have 
been thinking with Eugene Thacker, reading his book In the Dust of This 
Planet (2011). Even more recently, my appropriation of his terms has been 
aided and expanded by some work on the topic of new materialism, which 
has led me in turn to Speculative Realist thought.  
The problem of imminent environmental collapse is the issue. And 
the question concerns our apparent slowness to address the coming 
catastrophe, the extent to which it is a result of our inability to think 
a ‘world-without-us’, a world without humanity. (Thacker 2011: 5) Those 
are Thacker’s preferred phrases. At a sharp point of his argument, he 
proposes that we can succeed in thinking the world without us by 
mobilising a kind of thought that is not human. In fact, Thacker is 
rehearsing an old philosophical problem regarding how to imagine the far 
future, or the distant past. To do so is, inevitably, to cast a sensing 
human mind into that place/time, thus ensuring the distant time no longer 
without humanity.  
Reading Thacker, it strikes me that in many modern and contemporary 
cases, artists have tried, are trying, to invent non-human ways of 
thinking. It’s Jean-Francois Lyotard’s theme in The Inhuman: Reflections 
on Time. (1991) For our purposes today I want to share with you an analogy 
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that presents itself as a useful way of limiting the scope of what would 
otherwise be too expansive a discussion.  
The analogy is as follows. Forms of thought not already conditioned 
entirely by human concerns, thoughts from the outside, may be coaxed 
closer through the use of decoys. The implication here is that we have 
an inkling of how to think the world without us. We can catch a glimpse 
of it but, as the term implies, that view cannot be sustained. All the 
same, having seen it fleetingly, we have a model to work with and so the 
task of extending or sustaining that view beyond all human-centred 
apprehension is a form of work with its own politics. 
Just like hunters when they float carved wooden ducks on the water 
as a way of attracting their prey, we can use decoys to draw in thoughts 
that are not human. Certain structures for ideas, stories, images, perhaps 
defined to some extent by a resistance to the logic of sequence are the 
decoys in this case. 
 
• Several years ago, it occurred to me to experiment with the question 
of what it might mean to have and to communicate one idea. The thought 
was provoked by comments in Claire Parnet’s film interview with Gilles 
Deleuze. I have those recordings somewhere, can barely remember the point 
but feel committed to my encounter with the ideas, which has a certain 
kind of status in the absence of any solid grasp of what might have been 
the philosophical point and has that status on account of the 
peculiarities of the encounter, which draw me back again and again. Is 
there such a thing as one idea? What would it mean to communicate one 
idea? More to the point, what would it mean to interest a listener with 
the communication of one idea? The question invokes old philosophical 
problems of the relationships between parts and wholes, and perhaps more 
recent philosophical inquiries regarding ‘assemblage’. Maybe it’s a 
question betraying a certain fetishizing of clarity too, an irrational 
desire for a kind of communication that always proves impossible. In any 
event, since I never achieve it and since the desire does not go away, I 
conclude that it’s necessary to intensify the aspiration, to see if 
something like ‘one idea’ can be understood, even if only through a 
certain structuring of ideas where, if there are several or many, at 
least they are separated, for instance through enumeration, through the 
use of pullet points symbols, or asterisks placed centrally on the page, 
or through pauses in speaking. And it can be understood also that I am 
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flagging up, again, a practical exploration of discontinuity at work in 
this presentation.  
 
• A friend told me about something that took place when he came across 
Henri Rousseau’s Surprised!: Tiger in a Tropical Storm. (1891) You’ll be 
familiar with this over-reproduced painting. My friend’s experience in 
front of the painting had been, he told me, of the most astonishing kind. 
It was delusionary. When he looked at the picture he could hear and feel 
the warm rain. The sensation was so strong that he was inclined to be 
self-conscious, as if others standing near him in the National Gallery 
might notice the thunderstorm that was manifesting itself for him alone. 
Part of the curiosity of what took place, he said, was that when he turned 
away from the painting, the sensation stopped just as suddenly as it had 
begun. It was as if there was a switch. And that led him to play, like a 
child (on/off, on/off) with the simple gesture of turning his gaze towards 
the painting and then away.  
 In response to his account, I gave my friend some advice that I 
find surprising now when I think back on it. I told him to ignore what 
had happened. Perhaps I was worried for him that the event would become 
an obstacle to his viewing of paintings, that it would skew his 
expectations. Notably, he hasn’t followed the advice. Indeed, he has 
written on the topic and comes back to do so again and again, developing 
a way of thinking about what it means to look at images. Looking at 
images, he has written, always involves a choreographic movement of the 
body that must be understood as manifold. To look is a turning towards 
the image, and it is a turning away. In the end, it may be an argument 
that memory and anticipation of images are part of the encounter; hardly 
a new idea but inflected with a certain novelty through the 
autobiographical angle and the peculiarity of the details in this case.  
 
• Novelist Alain Robbe-Grillet affirms the most ordinary of scenes as key 
to his own resolution to be a writer, scenes characterised precisely by 
nothing unusual taking place: 
 
These sensations associated with night falling early in the winter 
city, or just after the beginning of term towards the end of autumn 
when the lights are already coming on early in the shabby shop 
windows of the neighbourhood bakers or grocers, while it’s still 
fairly mild and a fine drizzle sprinkles gleaming light onto the 
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unevenly paved streets, and charcoal grey pavements where the last 
decaying leaves from the plane trees cling, musky and glistening . 
. . I’ve often mentioned these vivid (yet peaceful) sensations of 
evening calm, welcoming lamps, the distant hum of the city, vegetable 
soup, the lampshade covered with scorched paper, as possibly the 
main reasons that impelled me to write a novel. I know exactly what 
it means to take up writing, having noticed the yellow of an old 
wall. (1988: 45) 
 
There’s much that could be said about these remarks, the first-apparent 
democratising of the writing process that tends to become its opposite 
as, rhetorically, Robbe-Grillet has us understand that he possessed the 
skill to see ordinariness, and that it might not be so easily achieved. 
But his remarks have another value, as a way of helping identify a 
superimposition that takes place in thought, especially, perhaps, when 
thought is taking place in a placid, everyday environment. A kind of 
neutrality provided by the space, which does not stimulate the senses in 
any remarkable or anomalous way, enables a different kind of seeing.  
 
• When working on my MA thesis some years ago I observed that another 
thesis was establishing itself in what seemed to me the most 
incontrovertibly material form, like a model, even while remaining ideal, 
in my thinking. What’s more, there seemed to have been no decision made 
on my part that there should be a second version of the thesis. Alongside 
the thesis, the idea of the thesis arrived of its own accord. It came 
with striking punctuality. I began to feel that I was working with 
something that had decision-making powers of its own, to come and go as 
it pleased. While welcoming its arrival every day, I did so with a measure 
of puzzlement regarding what it was doing and a certain level of suspicion 
about what it wanted. For every incoherence of my writing (all those I 
was aware of, however dimly) there was something incoherent in the model, 
something that, almost on an architectural level, didn’t work — an Ensor-
like corner where the rules of geometry were broken. Those inconsistencies 
gave me the strongest feeling — not any kind of solution about how to fix 
the point in my argument but more like a feeling in advance of any 
solution, a feeling of the kind that perhaps we’re familiar with from 
watching a calamity unfold, when we cannot influence events but find 
ourselves trying all the same. John Mullarkey writes about this topic in 
relation to disaster movies, noting how, in his experiment, viewers of 
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the film Titanic (1998) would testify to a certain kind of movement in 
their seats, as if doing so would tend the ship away from the iceberg it 
was about to strike — and despite being in no doubt about the conclusion 
of the story. (2007: 62) That’s the kind of feeling I had when considering 
the correlate of my thesis with its spatial coherence compromised by 
other-worldly glitches.  
 
• One of my colleagues describes how when she’s compelled in her reading 
of a book, the ideas come to situate themselves at locations familiar to 
her but that she has not been aware of choosing. So, Michel Serres’ ideas 
are distributed at a roundabout in Hoxton, by a playing field, in summer 
when the grass is dry and crisp to the touch. Wherever she is, whether 
she has the book in her hands or is merely rehearsing once more a memory 
of reading Michel Serres, she’s back in the same place positioning points 
of his argument where they have been placed before.  
 The commonality that interests me here is that sense of visitation 
already mentioned that another decision-making agent seems to be present. 
The one deciding where the events of the book are to be placed. We are 
familiar enough with theories of the divided psyche and there are 
frameworks available that would allow us to understand how one of those 
divided selves might not recognise another, hence feel the alien quality 
of another decision-making entity apparently invading the personal space 
of the mind. But I want to think this through in a different way, asking: 
what if the other agential power is less like a mirror of the self, less 
like a reverse side and more like . . . what? An interloper of some kind? 
A squatter? Or something less human? A spectre? An infestation emerging 
from the woodwork? All of these seem approximately right; none of them 
are quite right. 
 
• To think this way is to tap into current discourses around the ‘human’, 
particularly some comments by Eugene Thacker in his book In the Dust of 
this Planet (2011). Thacker’s framing is useful because of the audacious 
step in his argument.  Not only is the mind a site that can provide access 
(against one’s knowledge, against one’s will) to uninvited decision-
making powers that are not human, thought itself can be said to be not 
human, at least potentially so (2011:  7). Here, the mind is understood 
as a meeting place, a crossroads for various unexpected traffic. Thacker’s 
analogy is with the micro-organic symbionts that make up much of the 
body’s mass. If the body is ninety percent not human, might the same be 
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true of the mind? (2011: 7) Intuitively, the proposition seems to square 
with an experience that often we are not in control of the thoughts we 
think, that our thoughts are not acting in our interests. Again, on the 
one hand the psychoanalytic paradigm that would have us understand this 
situation as a self-in-conflict, and on the other a discourse in which 
the conscious thinking we identify with as ourselves is merely the 
emergent property of relations and interactions far beyond the human.  
 
• N. Katherine Hayles coins the term ‘unthought’ for strata of cognitive 
activity that she distinguishes from so-called ‘higher consciousness’ as 
the more significant and almost completely unknown foundation on which 
consciousness sits like the miniscule peak of an otherwise submerged 
iceberg (2017: 1). And what’s beneath (if ‘beneath’ is the right term) 
is a complex of agential, cognitive although not conscious decision-
making faculties that belong to the technologies we interact with as well 
as the micro-organisms that populate the gut and any number of other 
cognitions that come to shape a so-called human mind.  
 Hayles looks in some detail at a novel by Colson Whitehead called 
The Intuitionist. (1999) The protagonist, Lila Mae Watson, is an elevator 
inspector in an imagined culture of elevator inspection divided 
fundamentally between ‘empiricists’, whose methods are plodding and old-
fashioned, and ‘intuitionists’, who conduct their work in ways mysterious 
but statistically more effective than those of the conventional 
inspectors. Her intuitionist approach is described in the following way: 
 
Lila Mae […] leans against the dorsal wall of the elevator and 
listens. 125 Walker is only twelve floors high, and the vibration of 
the idling drive doesn’t diminish that much as it swims through the 
gritty loop of the diverting pulley, descending down the cables, 
navigates the suspension gear, and grasps the car. Lila Mae can feel 
the idling in her back. She hears the door operator click above her 
in the dark well and then the door shuts, halting a small degree as 
the strata of paint chafes. Three Gemco helical springs are standard-
issue buffers on Arbo elevators. They wait fifteen feet below her 
like stalagmites. “Press twelve,” Lila Mae orders the super. Even 
with her eyes closed she could have done it herself, but she’s trying 
to concentrate on the vibrations massaging her back. She can almost 
see them now. This elevator’s vibrations are resolving themselves in 
her mind as an aqua-blue cone. Her pen rests in her palm and her 
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grip loosens. It might fall. She shuts out the sound of the super’s 
breathing, which is a low rumble lilting into a wheeze at the ultimate 
convexity of his exhalation. That’s noise. The elevator moves. The 
elevator moves upwards in the well, towards the grunting in the 
machine room, and Lila Mae turns that into a picture, too. The 
ascension is a red spike circling around the blue cone, which doubles 
in size and wobbles as the elevator starts climbing. (1999: 5) 
 
I want to say that the correspondence in Whitehead’s novel with the non-
conscious cognition theme becomes less strong at the point he attributes 
his character’s correlating model to her personal proclivity for 
geometric shapes. “Everyone has their own set of genies.” (1999: 6) The 
elements will be gleaned from somewhere but it’s the mode of their 
assemblage and their tendencies that are the point. Those qualities are 
achieved by other decision-making agents.  
 
Perhaps the call here is for a kind of fallow work during which ideas-
in-the-making map themselves onto a scene, a ‘New Materialism’ in which 
the ideal is drawn out of a real scene just as much as it is superimposed 
by the eye’s idle traversing. Let’s say the scene must be one in which 
nothing much is happening, that top corner of the room you can see above 
your screen when you’re working in the kitchen, the portion between the 
larder door and the ceiling, where the principles of alien organisation 
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